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CPR – WHAT HAS HISTORY TAUGHT US?
Dr. James Jude, a Hopkins-trained thoracic surgeon, died in Florida last July. Jude 
was one of a number of physicians in the Baltimore area who helped develop modern 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) techniques in the late 1950s. Back then, sudden 
cardiac arrest was often triggered by medical procedures performed on hospitalized 
patients, such as anesthesia during surgery. Until that time, the standard method of 
resuscitating a patient involved direct cardiac massage—something that typically 
required a thoracic surgeon 
to cut open the patient’s chest 
(Jude, 2003). CPR offered the 
opportunity to save many lives. 
Before that goal could be fully 
realized, widespread education 
and training was needed. 
The evolution from CPR’s 
innovation to its widespread 
application offers some lessons 
for the challenges encountered 
in its current use.
CPR is unique in that it 
is administered as a default 
procedure unless a medical order is written that it be withheld. This raises the question 
of how the decision is—and should be—made to withhold CPR attempts. Dr. Baxter’s 
essay and the case study in this issue raise this very question: If a patient’s death is 
imminent and the goals of care thus shift toward preserving dignity and comfort, 
should CPR even be offered? 
For a growing number of individuals, death is preceded by extended stays in 
intensive care unit (ICU) settings that obfuscate the line drawn where death is deemed 
“imminent.” This is relevant because the imminence of death marks a clear transition 
from a clinician’s duty to preserve life (often at the expense of comfort) to a duty 
to prioritize comfort and dignity during the dying process. Of course, we should 
prioritize a patient’s comfort and dignity throughout the disease trajectory. However, 
as unavoidable death draws nearer, maintaining comfort and dignity becomes a central 
focus. The burden of a particular life-saving intervention should thus be weighed 
against its benefits. When death is truly imminent, CPR provides no benefit to the 
patient. Benefit to the bereaved who may view failed CPR as the ultimate evidence 
that everything was tried to save their loved one’s life raises the question of whether 
it’s appropriate to provide CPR merely for the psychological benefit to survivors—
what some have depicted as a modern “death ritual” (Lantos, 1992; Truog, 2010).
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The information in this newsletter
is not intended to provide legal 
advice or opinion and should not be 
acted upon without consulting an 
attorney.
Jude and his colleagues 
foreshadowed this situation. He and 
his collaborator and coauthor James 
Elam made it clear that CPR should 
only be used with patients who 
experience sudden cardiac arrest who 
could be successfully defibrillated/
revived. In their 1965 book, 
Fundamentals of Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation, Elam and Jude 
emphasize that CPR is inappropriate 
to use with dying patients. Consider 
this exchange between Elam and an 
attendee of the ad hoc conference 
on cardiopulmonary resuscitation, 
convened by the National Research 
Council of the National Academy of 
Sciences in 1966.  
Q: When do you start or decide 
not to start CPR?
A. (Elam): “This has been critically 
reviewed by the committee ... You 
start CPR whenever there is a sudden 
cardiac arrest. You do not start it on a 
patient with an incurable or intractable 
chronic disease. You do not start it 
when you are sure that the patient has 
been clinically dead for so long that 
resuscitation with a viable brain is out 
of the question. If you are not sure 
about starting, the patient deserves 
the benefit of the doubt. If in doubt, 
start CPR and then determine the pre-
arrest time and status of the patient 
as quickly as possible so that you can 
decide whether to continue CPR or to 
stop it.” (NRC-NAS, 1966, p. 195)
There are three critical points 
here: (1) Whether to attempt CPR 
is a medical decision; (2) CPR is 
inappropriate when death is expected 
and unavoidable; and (3) If valid 
ambiguity exists among clinicians 
at the bedside, CPR can be started 
but should be stopped as soon as it is 
deemed inappropriate. The first point 
was less controversial in the 1960s, 
when physicians routinely made 
decisions without much input from 
patients and families about which 
end-of-life treatments to provide or 
withhold. In today’s legalistic and 
patient-rights-driven era, clinicians 
prefer getting permission to withhold 
CPR attempts. However, this implies 
that patients or their surrogate 
decision-makers have the final say. 
This often doesn’t “feel” right when 
involving patients who won’t survive 
discharge from the ICU—not to the 
bereaved who feel implicated in the 
decision to “allow” their loved one 
to die, nor to clinicians who prefer a 
more peaceful send-off for a dying 
patient than “ritualized CPR.” 
Once again, revisiting CPR’s 
origins may provide some guidance. 
Several organizations, such as the 
American Red Cross and the American 
Heart Association, spent concerted, 
widespread, long-term efforts at 
training first responders to do CPR. 
Initially, training was limited to health 
care providers, then expanded to 
emergency medical technicians, and 
later, directed toward lay persons. 
Early education and training, such as 
the ad hoc CPR conference mentioned 
above (NRC-NAS, 1966), went into 
fine detail about all aspects of CPR 
provision, such as how to outfit 
ambulances to allow enough physical 
space to properly perform CPR, and 
how to address attitudinal barriers. 
CPR 
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Consider this exchange between Dr. 
Larry Birch and an attendee:
Q: Will considerable psychologic 
training be needed? I find that most 
nurses who have been trained say 
they would not use CPR because it is 
a doctor’s job. 
A (Birch): “I think nurses who have 
been reluctant to use CPR are not 
doing so because of a psychological 
block. This hesitancy relates to the 
question of what is nursing practice 
and what is medical practice.” (NRC-
NAS, 1966, p. 190)
With adequate training, nurses 
overcame their resistance to 
providing CPR and soon accounted 
for the largest group of health care 
professionals to perform the technique. 
Today, clinicians’ moral distress 
related to CPR relates more to whether 
or when they can refuse to perform 
it. Moral concerns about attempting 
CPR on dying patients is sometimes 
centered on the unnecessary suffering 
this causes the patient. This is not a 
compelling logical argument, as it’s 
unlikely that a patient undergoing 
chest compressions and cardiac 
defibrillation is conscious enough 
to feel pain and discomfort (future 
suffering if they are successfully 
revived notwithstanding). More likely, 
clinicians at the bedside feel that CPR 
attempts are not the appropriate way 
to demonstrate care and respect for a 
dying or dead person’s body. 
Granted, what constitutes 
appropriate respect for a dead body 
depends on context and culture. 
Methods of attempting to revive the 
recently deceased have existed for 
centuries, and include whipping the 
body with stinging nettles, blowing 
smoke into an animal bladder and 
then into the rectum, hanging the 
body upside down, or over a barrel 
that is moved back and forth, or over 
a trotting horse, and burying a body 
up to the chest and splashing water on 
the face (National Research Council, 
1966). Such indignities were justified 
if meaningful life was saved. Thus, 
the burden of the indignity needs to 
be weighed against its benefit. This 
weighing process has become more 
complex in today’s healthcare climate. 
Concerns of patients, bereaved loved 
ones, and clinicians at the bedside 
all deserve attention, as well as how 
to fairly allocate finite healthcare 
resources. Education and training for 
when not to attempt CPR, and what 
will be done instead, is multi-layered, 
complex, and a grand undertaking. 
It’s time to delve into the fine details, 
as we learned from the CPR pioneers. 
Clearly this is still a work in progress.
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
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ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE MARYLAND MOLST FORM: 
HOW CAN WE DO BETTER?
The following are two relatively recent 
initiatives aimed at improving end-of-
life care:
1. Completing an advance 
directive that specifies 
a person’s end-of-life 
preferences in order to guide 
future decisions (usually, 
when a person can’t make 
decisions for himself and 
is considered terminal or 
irreversibly unconscious); and
2. Having a clinician complete 
a Maryland Medical Orders 
for Life-Sustaining Treatment 
(MOLST) form, which 
specifies the patient’s present 
resuscitation status and which 
life-sustaining treatments he 
wants or doesn’t want.
Unfortunately, both documents are 
only as good as the conversations 
informing how they are completed. 
Hospice physician Shahid Aziz 
proposes one approach to a better-
quality discussion about end-of-life 
preferences. Instead of completing 
a traditional living will that asks 
individuals to select how much 
technology they would want 
clinicians to use to keep them 
alive if in a terminal condition, 
persistent vegetative state, or end-
stage condition, Dr. Aziz instructs 
individuals to answer the following 
three questions and discuss their 
answers with their healthcare provider 
and the person who will make medical 
decisions for them when they lack 
capacity to make their own decisions:
1. What is the minimum level 
of mental functioning that 
is acceptable to you with 
the help of life-prolonging 
treatments?
Cont. on page 4
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2. What is the minimum level 
of physical functioning that 
is acceptable to you with 
the help of life-prolonging 
treatments?
3. What life-prolonging 
treatments are acceptable 
to use (indefinitely, or 
for a trial period) or not 
acceptable to get you to your 
minimum acceptable level of 
functioning? 
Dr. Aziz recently led a workshop 
entitled, “Courageous Conversations 
on Death and Dying,” where he 
encouraged attendees to dialogue 
about how they would answer these 
questions. Workshop attendee “Bob” 
volunteered for some role play, and 
initially ran into a few roadblocks 
with how such conversations can go. 
When pondering his minimum level of 
mental functioning, after a long pause, 
he replied, “I’d want to be happy.” 
Of course, happiness is subjective, 
and it’s likely that clinicians around 
Bob’s bedside would have different 
impressions of whether they could 
Table 1. Continuum of End-of-Life Preferences and Ensuing Clinician Duties
VITALIST
“Do everything possible to 
keep me alive”
PRAGMATIST
“Try your best to achieve 
[goal] in [time or burden 
estimate], and if it doesn’t 
work, stop”
NON- 
INTERVENTIONIST        
“Never put me on machines! 
Ever!” 
CLINICIAN DUTIES Clarify understanding of 
exceptions (e.g., brain 
death, medically ineffective 
interventions)
Discuss “three questions” 
– focus on minimum 
acceptable levels of physical 
and mental functioning
Clarify whether any ex-
ceptions are allowed (e.g., 
anaphylaxis, choking);
persuade to consider less 
extreme position (e.g., allow 
short trials)
Get consensus on standard of care and invest time to get treatment team and supportive 
staff on same page, acknowledge “reasonable degree” part of medical certainty, have 
treatment team communicate with one voice, don’t offer false choices, make clear medical 
recommendations and communicate them directly and compassionately, ensure buy-in via 
fair practices (i.e., treat like cases alike at systems level), educate patients and surrogates 
about the moral justification for withdrawing life support to allow natural death, provide 
exceptional end-of-life care regardless of patient’s code status.
restore him to a baseline state of 
happiness. With some additional 
probing, it became clear that Bob 
valued being able to meaningfully 
communicate with others. Dr. Aziz 
suggests that instead of telling 
clinicians what treatments you 
want or don’t want (unless there are 
absolute restrictions such as religious 
prohibitions on blood product use), 
you should let them use whatever 
tools available in their medical toolkit 
and scope of practice to get you to 
your minimum acceptable level of 
functioning. They would then write 
MOLST orders based on a better 
understanding of your goals of care.
Of course, the challenge in such an 
exercise is that it’s difficult to imagine 
all possible scenarios and to accurately 
predict how your future self will judge 
what makes life meaningful. Perhaps it 
would be more useful to communicate 
where you fall on a continuum of 
“wanting everything” the ICU has to 
offer (let’s call that person a “vitalist”) 
versus “wanting nothing” done to 
prolong life (let’s call that person a 
“non-interventionist”). Relying on 
a traditional living will to inform 
which treatments to use, withhold, 
or withdraw at the end of life may be 
more useful for those who fall on the 
extremes of the continuum; less so for 
the vast majority in the middle—i.e., 
those willing to try life-prolonging 
interventions and stop them if they 
don’t achieve their intended goal (let’s 
call them “pragmatists”).
Could using Dr. Aziz’s three 
questions and knowledge of where 
a person falls on the continuum be a 
useful replacement or complement 
to traditional living will forms? 
Perhaps. Again, the usefulness of 
this approach rests on the quality of 
the conversation that elucidates a 
person’s end-of-life preferences, the 
ability to effectively communicate 
those expressed preferences (i.e., in 
written wishes through a living will, or 
to an informed appointed health care 
agent), and the success in translating 
those wishes into appropriate orders 
on a MOLST form. Table 1 lists 
suggested duties the clinician has 
Advance Directives 
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when conversing with individuals 
falling on different places along the 
end-of-life intervention preferences 
continuum. Most individuals need 
to be educated about what realistic 
options are available, and may need to 
be persuaded to consider alternative 
perspectives. For example, given the 
complexity in determining when death 
is imminent and the value that comes 
with limited trials of therapy, a great 
advance in end-of-life care may come 
with more widespread acceptance 
of limited trials of life support 
technology that is then stopped if it 
doesn’t achieve its intended goal. 
This is easier said than done. The 
“technology-creep” of acute-care life-
prolonging interventions often makes 
it more difficult for clinicians and 
loved ones to accept that the physical 
and emotional investment in such 
therapies has not paid off. Patients and 
their loved ones need to be prepared 
in advance for what “stopping” 
aggressive life support will look and 
feel like, and how the patient and 
family will be supported. Palliative 
care should be embraced and held up 
as a new version of “doing everything” 
(rather than the oft-repeated phrase 
heard in ICUs of “withdrawing care” 
to indicate the switch to comfort care).
Having these courageous 
conversations about end-of-life 
preferences and documenting them can 
take the burden off of individuals (e.g., 
surrogates, clinicians) for making the 
final decision to let a patient die. The 
focus can then shift away from guilt 
or moral distress toward the tasks of 
dying and bereavement. Each person 
(the patient, the surrogate, the clinician 
elucidating end-of-life preferences) 
must do his or her own part (see Table 
2). To learn more about Dr. Aziz’s 
three question approach to end-of-life 
conversations, visit his blog, “You 
Deserve a Good Death,” at http://
death.blogspot.com/?m=1. 
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
PATIENT SURROGATE CLINICIAN
• Choose someone you trust to 
speak for you when you can’t
• Appoint that person as your health 
care agent (HCA)
• Discuss your preferences with 
your appointed HCA
• Document your preferences (either 
in a standard living will or written 
letter)
• Have your documented end-of-life 
preferences available when needed
• Discuss your preferences with 
your health care provider (give 
him/her a copy of what you wrote 
down)
• Keep a copy of the patient’s writ-
ten end-of-life wishes and HCA 
appointment
• Discuss the patient’s preferences 
with him/her
• Recognize your obligations to 
know the patient’s preferences and 
advocate for him/her (not for what 
you would want for yourself)
• If the patient would agree, con-
sider the value of limited trials of 
life-prolonging interventions and 
their withdrawal when clinicians 
decide they won’t achieve their 
intended goal 
• Recognize that facilitating a 
“least-bad” death for a patient and 
minimizing future regrets/ psycho-
logical angst among the bereaved 
is a valued public health goal and 
laudable goal of medicine
• Find ways to enhance your end-
of-life communication skills (e.g., 
http://depts.washington.edu/ 
oncotalk/) 
• Identify standard of care practices, 
achieve consensus from your col-
leagues, and give clear recommen-
dations rather than offering false 
choices
Table 2. Duties of patients, surrogates, and clinicians in end-of-life planning and care
QUINLAN’S and CRUZAN’S LEGACIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR  
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND MARYLAND MOLST
Forty years ago, Karen Ann Quinlan suffered brain damage that caused irreversible unconsciousness. She was kept 
alive with ventilator support and medically-provided nutrition and hydration through a gastrostomy tube (“g-tube 
feedings”). Her parents won an appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court that allowed Karen’s ventilator support to be 
withdrawn, something that was previously considered by many to violate a physician’s professional code of ethics and 
possibly to constitute homicide. Karen breathed on her own and lived nine years longer on the g-tube feedings. She 
died thirty years ago, from respiratory failure. 
Five years later—this year marks the 25th anniversary— Nancy Cruzan died after a long legal battle to allow her 
parents to stop her g-tube feedings. She entered into a persistent vegetative state (PVS) seven years earlier, in 1983, 
after she suffered severe brain damage in an automobile collision. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the state of 
cont'd on p. 6
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Missouri could impose a “clear and convincing” standard to determine that an incapacitated person’s g-tube feedings 
could be stopped. Subsequent to the Supreme Court case, a lower court in Missouri decided this standard had been 
met, resulting in Nancy’s g-tube feedings being withdrawn. She died shortly after, in 1990. This influenced the cre-
ation of health care directives (“advance directives”) and the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act, a federal 
law that requires health care institutions to inform adult patients being admitted to their facility (with some excep-
tions) about advance directives, and to honor a patient’s advance directive. 
While a living will is the gold standard for providing “clear and convincing evidence” that life-prolonging measures 
such as g-tube feedings, dialysis, or ventilator support should be withheld if one is dying or irreversibly unconscious, 
most adults don’t complete one. For those who do, their living will is sometimes ignored, either because a surrogate 
demands treatment despite it being precluded in the living will, or the living will isn’t accessible when it’s needed, 
or physicians do not consider the patient to be in a “qualifying” condition triggering the living will (e.g., a terminal 
condition or death being “imminent”). 
Some think the Maryland Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST) form is a preferable method 
of communicating a patient’s end-of-life treatment preferences. MOLST orders are transferable medical orders that 
reflect what should be done now if a patient experiences a potentially fatal circulatory or respiratory crisis, while an 
advance directive reflects what should be done in the future—usually, when an individual has reached a point where 
she/he is less willing to undergo medical procedures that produce discomfort because the resulting life prolongation 
would not be worth the burden and discomforts associated with those procedures.
A recent study MHECN undertook this year with funding support from the Maryland Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene explored the use of the MOLST form and advance directives in Maryland healthcare facilities. 
Excluding non-psychiatric, non-obstetric, non-trauma admissions, 47.5% of adults had a MOLST form on hospital 
admission, and 84% who were discharged from the hospital to a “qualifying” facility (i.e., home health, hospice, 
long-term care, a sub-acute facility, or a dialysis center) had a completed MOLST form on record. However, only 
30.5% of hospital patients included in the study had an advance directive. 
Of note, 68% of patients who died during hospitalization had no documentation in their medical record that they 
were in a terminal condition. A qualitative review of the causes of hospital admission for these patients revealed that 
many of these deaths would have been expected. This suggests that the most common condition triggering a living 
will to be in effect—a terminal condition—is often not recognized by clinicians. The difficulty identifying when a pa-
tient is considered “terminal” or “imminently dying” and the low living will completion rate threatens the likelihood 
that the MOLST program will achieve its ultimate goal of complementing advance directive use and improving end-
of-life care in Maryland. However, as Quinlan’s and Cruzan’s legacies demonstrate, attitudes and end-of-life practices 
evolve—hopefully for the better.
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by 
the Law and Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose 
of MHECN is to facilitate and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings 
by supporting and providing informational and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care 
institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network attempts to achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as 
they strive to assist their institution act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the 
general public on ethical issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in 
Maryland.
MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from 
affiliate members who provide additional financial support.
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter  7
A PHYSICIAN’S PLEA
Dr. David Baxter is an internal medicine physician who teaches at Memorial University Medical Center and Mercer 
Medical School in Savannah, Georgia. He writes here about harms that occur when family members insist that a dying 
loved one's death be prolonged in the intensive care unit (ICU) at all costs, and how compassionate health care providers 
should respond.
His earthly journey was finally over. 
A man imminently and obviously 
dying, now finally released from his 
captors. He did not clearly express 
his will earlier in life, and his family 
did not seek his will but their own. 
A lone, long distance family member 
threatened, cajoled and harassed the 
other family members as well as the 
clinicians. The clearly appropriate, 
medical treatment was comfort care, 
but because of one strident voice, 
comfort was substituted for the ICU, 
ventilators and vasopressors.
The initial stage of his illness 
was thought only to be a chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD) exacerbation. Subsequent 
respiratory failure led to the revelation 
of a previously unknown advanced 
lung malignancy. Surgery would 
be an immediate sentence of death. 
Chemotherapy was demanded and 
reluctantly given with no result except 
for severe, almost deadly side effects. 
All but one family member could see 
the situation with emotional clarity.
Ethics meetings and family meetings 
followed, but the lone, shrieking voice 
of compulsion could not be abated. 
Ethical “futility” was proclaimed. The 
threat of litigation drove the ICU stay 
to continue. The lawyers thought they 
had made the decision, but death—
the final arbiter—would eventually 
prevail. As professionals we must 
remain in our clinical roles, but in 
these times of turmoil and conflict, we 
are torn by our humanity. As humans 
we are aware of our rights but less 
so our responsibilities. In our current 
health care world, we clinicians are 
aware of our responsibility yet sense 
a limitation of our rights. Patient 
autonomy has become the prime 
meridian. This has led to clinicians 
being told what to do (most often by 
families) when clinical benefit is not 
easily documented and often obviously 
absent.
Anger and frustration abound 
while watching this sight of sadness. 
Not being allowed to provide the 
appropriate comfort care, but to flog 
a fellow human being is morally 
repulsive. I don’t care how much you 
argue that with good pain control 
the patient would not suffer, I don’t 
believe you. Intubated and sedated in 
the ICU, even with the best care, is not 
comfortable. When is “do everything” 
going to be accepted to mean 
"everything reasonable”? When are we 
going to allow physicians to practice 
their art and not be held hostage to a 
belligerent, berating bully?
Medical therapies are utilized based 
on reasonable and likely results. 
Risks and benefits are weighed 
daily—almost unconsciously— as we 
artfully apply science to individual 
patients. As medical care is offered, 
it is either accepted or refused. Every 
day patients refuse medical care we 
deem important. This refusal of care 
is bothersome, but in a patient of 
age and capacity, the patient's will is 
allowed to prevail. When the clinicians 
know the clear will of the patient a 
demand to “do everything” is usually 
refined with reasonable goals of care. 
Everything possible should be defined 
as clinically rational and reasonable. 
To amputate a toe for a hang nail 
would be clinically wrong and morally 
repulsive. To intubate, sedate and 
essentially flog a patient dying of 
terminal disease near death is also, in 
my view, clinically inappropriate and 
morally repulsive.
When medical care that is not 
clearly indicated is demanded by 
family, the physicians should not be 
held hostage, particularly by the fear 
of litigation. Treatments that are not 
medically appropriate are not care but 
cruelty. These demands lead to moral 
conflict in the treating team.
Examples of patient demands 
abound. The relatively common 
demand for antibiotics for viral 
illnesses driven by physician pacifism 
and fear of litigation has led to the 
death of many from worsening 
antibiotic resistance patterns. As 
participant pawns in this drama, the 
medical caregivers feel helpless. 
Helplessness leads to hopelessness. 
Anger and frustration are quickly 
birthed.
 “We” as health care professionals 
never cure the real problem. Death, the 
inevitable enemy, is always lurking. 
Our earthly technologies and potions 
only temporize the pangs of death. 
The mysteries of science only prod the 
inherent miracles active in the body. 
The surgeon cuts and sews, but the 
body heals. The internist pokes, prods 
and prescribes potions, but the body 
has to absorb and process so the true 
miracle, life itself, may continue.
Currently the law, which in reality 
is designed to prevent harm, not 
compel good, allows fellow human 
beings to be forced to go beyond 
the reasonable, often in the guise of 
hoping for a miracle. Often we are told 
that a “miracle” of the Lord is what is 
expected. In these situations God has 
already spoken. We just won’t accept 
what He has said.
The true miracle is life itself.
J. David Baxter, MD
Mercer University School of 
Medicine
Savannah, GA
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Baby CE is an 11-day-old female 
who was born at 23 weeks and 5 days 
of gestation and is now in multi-organ 
failure. She is the surviving neonate of 
a twin pregnancy. She was designated 
Baby A in utero.
Baby CE’s mother went into labor 
at 23 weeks and 5 days. She had a 
spontaneous rupture of membranes, at 
which time her cerclage was removed 
and purulent drainage was noted 
coming from the cervical opening. The 
twins were then delivered via cesarean 
section. Baby B was stillborn. Baby 
A, named Baby CE, was successfully 
resuscitated and stabilized, weighing a 
mere 550 g (1 lb 3 oz).
Baby CE’s prognosis was grim 
at birth. She had a critical, though 
expected, course for the first 5 days 
of life. She required significant 
ventilator support and developed 
pulmonary interstitial emphysema. 
She was hypotensive, which required 
pressors for support, and ultimately 
received medical treatment for a 
patent ductus arteriosus (a congenital 
disorder wherein a neonate’s ductus 
arteriosus fails to close after birth). 
She was hyperglycemic and required 
an insulin drip. She was found, by 
head ultrasound, to have bilateral 
grade 2 intraventricular hemorrhages. 
As is typical, she received blood 
transfusions and broad-spectrum 
antibiotics.
Day 6, however, was a turning 
point in the wrong direction. Baby 
CE had a pulmonary hemorrhage 
but managed to survive. She was 
coded with chest compressions and 
epinephrine. She required multiple 
blood products in order to be 
stabilized. She also required increased 
pressor support, and was found to 
have several new, extensive bilateral 
cerebellar hemorrhages. In addition, 
she was found to have a significant 
liver hematoma, which may have 
been secondary to the known physical 
trauma a code can induce.
During the night of her eighth day 
of life, Baby CE once again became 
severely hypoxic and bradycardic from 
a presumed pulmonary hemorrhage. 
Over the next several days, Baby CE’s 
overall status worsened. The team was 
becoming increasingly uncomfortable 
continuing to provide life-extending 
therapy they felt was not indicated and 
would never help Baby CE.
Now, on day 11 of life, the baby’s 
course is not going well. The NICU 
team, including a neonatologist, 
nurse, social worker, and chaplain, 
meets with the parents to discuss 
their concerns about Baby CE. The 
team explains that Baby CE has no 
meaningful expectation of survival 
and has signs indicating respiratory, 
cardiac, liver, and kidney failure at 
this time. Additionally, if she were 
to survive, she is expected to have 
profound neurologic impairment.
Baby CE’s parents are quiet through 
much of the meeting, but express 
their faith that the NICU team will 
do everything they can to save their 
baby. The team explains that at this 
point they can continue to support 
Baby CE with the current management 
if that is the family’s desire. They 
feel, however, that should she decline 
further, cardiac compressions and 
epinephrine no longer would be 
indicated. The team explains that 
cardiac compressions are generally not 
useful in the NICU, especially when 
the cardiac failure is a result of overall 
multi-organ failure. They point out 
that cardiac compressions can cause 
substantial trauma to infants. Baby 
CE’s parents remain quiet, tearful, and 
undecided as to whether they believe 
compressions ought to be performed 
or not.
The NICU team is distraught at the 
end of the meeting; the team is uneasy 
with the parents’ unwillingness to 
accept that resuscitative efforts are 
likely not in the baby’s best interests. 
The NICU group knows that in some 
jurisdictions, including their own, a 
patient’s or surrogate’s permission is 
not needed for a physician to write 
an AND/LT (Allow Natural Death/
Limited Therapy) order. The team 
involves other NICU physicians and 
senior nurses in a discussion about the 
care and ethical dilemmas surrounding 
Baby CE. Some members of the team 
feel that if cardiac compressions will 
not be helpful to the infant, then they 
should not be offered or provided. 
Other members feel that the parents’ 
lack of agreement with the NICU 
physicians means that the NICU 
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analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit 
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case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify 
the submitter or institution. We may also change facts to protect confidentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to  
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
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team should do everything possible, 
regardless of the potential harm and 
lack of expected benefit to the infant, 
to keep this infant alive, at least for 
now. Other members still are hopeful 
that with some additional time the 
parents will be able to accept the 
physicians’ recommendation not to 
resuscitate. Some members point out 
that because many parents feel this 
decision is too burdensome — that to 
agree not to resuscitate would mean 
that they were giving up on their child, 
something they could never live with 
— the team should not even be asking 
the parents anything at this point; 
they should simply tell them that 
resuscitation would not be attempted 
in the face of a cardiac arrest. Having 
already lost one of their twins, this 
family may simply be unable to say 
that it is okay to stop resuscitative 
efforts. An ethics consult is requested 
to help determine the best course of 
action.
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A 
NEONATOLOGIST & CLINICAL 
ETHICS STAFF
Neonatologist Dr. Courtney De 
Jesso and Staff from the Center 
for Ethics at MedStar Washington 
Hospital Center (WHC) provide here 
(reprinted with permission) what an 
ethics consultation chart note with 
recommendations would look like for 
this case.
CHART NOTE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Ethics consultation requested 
by neonatology intensive care unit 
(NICU) regarding an 11-day-old 
female infant born prematurely at 
23 weeks and 5 days gestation and 
currently suffering multi-organ system 
failure. Ethics holds a discussion 
with the infant’s primary physician 
and the rest of the NICU team in an 
effort to learn the specifics of the 
medical circumstances and to gather 
a comprehensive picture of the team’s 
concerns in relation to the parents’ 
inability to make a decision. Primary 
concerns of the team surround an 
ethical justification to act on what they 
feel is in the best interest of the infant 
in light of the parents’ indecision. 
The NICU team wants to explore the 
ethics of the possible paternalism 
of making the decision about future 
resuscitation themselves. Further, the 
team is interested in the ramifications 
if the parents decide they want full 
coding efforts taken and the team 
remains opposed. Another concern 
is about whether asking them to 
essentially “give up” on their infant 
places an overwhelming emotional 
burden, which they are currently 
psychologically unfit to bear —how 
would the team know that and if they 
could determine that was the case, 
what should they do?
Subsequent to the team meeting, a 
separate conversation was had with 
the parents. The parents were still 
visibly distraught, though tranquil, 
having come no closer to making 
a decision themselves. They did, 
however, recognize the gravity of their 
infant’s prognosis and were able to 
reasonably understand the futility and 
further trauma that would likely come 
as a result of additional resuscitative 
measures. They confessed to an 
inability to come to terms emotionally 
with making the finite decision to 
actually request measures not be taken. 
The father’s last statement was, “We 
just can’t tell them to stop, but they 
should do whatever they think is best.” 
Ethics communicates the results of the 
meeting to the NICU team.
Ethics recommends that the 
physician, with at least 1 or 2 other 
members of the NICU team, meet with 
the parents to explain that if the baby 
codes (unless there is improvement in 
the baby from where she is right now), 
resuscitation will not be initiated—that 
is, if the baby’s heart stops, that will 
be the way everyone knows it is time 
to stop.
REASONING
This case illustrates an often 
occurring and dilemmatic feature in a 
clinical ethics consultation involving 
parents of a dying infant—that is, 
when what is in the best interest of 
a patient is reasonably understood 
by all, but rendered emotionally 
unacceptable by family or loved ones. 
Often, some additional time is all 
that is needed for family members to 
negotiate the psychological resistance 
to coming to terms with what they are 
able to rationally accept. However, 
just as often, family members simply 
cannot bear the weight of making such 
a decision no matter how long they are 
given, or the time to lengthily reflect is 
simply not available given the clinical 
circumstance.
Sometimes, it may be best that 
the medical team refocuses around 
the cessation of the demand for a 
decision, rather than continuing to 
insist. Sometimes the insistence itself 
is ethically objectionable. Often, just 
taking the proper steps to gain the 
parents’ understanding and acceptance 
that, without a definitive position from 
them, the medical team will do what 
they believe is in the patient’s best 
interest. Often, the relief associated 
with not having to make a decision of 
this significance, and thus carry the 
moral distress and emotional weight 
related to the choice, is often all that 
may be unconsciously sought by 
parents and/or other family members 
suffering through the tremendous 
anxiety that comes with such a 
responsibility.
Identifying this complex state of 
mind in family members is no easy 
task. Clinicians ought to be mindful, 
however, of communicative signs 
that indicate a person’s acceptance 
or resignation to the clinical 
circumstance. The removal of the 
absolute requirement for parents and/
Cont. on page 10
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or other family members to make a 
decision may be needed in order to 
reduce said anxiety and allow these 
individuals the ability to release the 
guilt associated with making this 
difficult decision.
Courtney E. De Jesso, MD
Neonatal-perinatal Fellow, MedStar 
Georgetown University Hospital.
The Editorial Group of the Center 
for Ethics at MedStar Washington 
Hospital Center
COMMENTS FROM A 
NEONATOLOGIST
Sharing treatment options with 
families in the neonatal ICU is not a 
straightforward task. 
How do I know which treatment 
decisions to share? Should I offer 
choices of antibiotics for urinary 
tract infection?  Choices of formula?  
Choices of pain management for 
central line placement?  And should 
I offer every family those choices?  
The 15 year old mother?  The non-
English speaking parent with a 4th 
grade education? How should I 
help them make the decision? How 
can I be certain that my colleagues 
would offer these same choices—and 
should we disclose to parents that 
we all have different practices in this 
regard? Should I formally obtain and 
document the parents’ consent for 
these treatments—and how detailed 
does that consent have to be?  If the 
family agreed that I should choose 
the specific antibiotic, is it valid to 
document that “the family agreed with 
my choice of amoxicillin?”
These considerations are contrived, 
but their essential elements 
underlie discussions regarding 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation with 
families of sick infants in the NICU. 
Consistency, fairness, transparency, 
and autonomy are core components of 
collaborating with families to make 
decisions about CPR. Compassion 
and equanimity are just as important:  
these decisions require hard work, and 
we (both families and clinicians) are 
all doing the best we can. 
A decision for, or against, neonatal 
CPR is usually one element of 
a much larger and complicated 
narrative.  Whereas code status for 
adult patients is often discussed 
upon routine hospital admission 
or during outpatient discussion of 
advanced directives, the need to plan 
for neonatal CPR is not routine or 
hypothetical.  Families of these infants 
are always in the midst of chaotic and 
emotional experiences, and rarely 
prioritize factual information—such as 
chance of successful CPR—the way 
that clinicians do.
As Blinderman et al. (2012) 
described, if clinicians present CPR 
to families as the default option (“we 
will plan to resuscitate unless you 
tell us not to”) it may be perceived 
as a recommendation. Averting 
this scenario requires upstream and 
intentional decisions by clinicians 
about whether or not CPR is a valid 
intervention (Mercurio, et al., 2014).  
All too often, clinicians perceive 
their duty to be to offer all families 
the option of CPR regardless of the 
medical scenario. In the case of Baby 
CE, once it became clear that the 
infant was dying, the clinicians could 
have decided to not offer CPR to the 
family at all. Instead, the clinicians 
told the family that CPR was “not 
indicated” and “generally not useful.”  
Following Blinderman’s approach, 
the clinicians could have more clearly 
indicated that CPR does not work for 
patients like Baby CE and therefore 
would not be used. By not offering it, 
the family is relieved of the burden 
to decide. If the family had actively 
objected to withholding CPR, ethics 
consultation would be the next step. 
In this case, it appears that the NICU 
clinicians considered taking the CPR 
decision back from the parents after 
offering it, and invited the broader 
NICU team to discuss this approach. 
Predictably, there was not 100% 
agreement among the clinicians about 
what should be done. This is nearly 
always the case, and can heighten staff 
distress because it highlights conflict 
within the team. But consensus 
decisions do not require 100% 
agreement, they require majority 
agreement. Protocols for conscientious 
objection ought to be discussed with 
those clinicians who feel they cannot 
participate in the plan of care. 
The language of ethical, 
professional, and legal guidelines that 
help clinicians approach end-of-life 
decision-making with families always 
includes some measure of ambiguity 
(“medically indicated,” “inevitable 
demise,” “potentially helpful”). An 
understandable motivation to reduce 
our decisional burden can lead us to 
oversimplify our approach and simply 
“offer everything” for every patient. 
It is important to recognize when our 
decision-making paradigm merely 
offsets the burden to families.  
Renee D. Boss, M.D., M.H.S.
Associate Professor
Johns Hopkins Division of 
Neonatology
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of 
Bioethics
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Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Jeremy Greene, MD, PhD, MA, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, 
Baltimore, MD. For more information, visit  http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series. 
25 (12N-1:15pm) 
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Mark Rothstein, JD, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, Baltimore, MD. 
For more information, visit  http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
FEBRUARY
4 (12N-1:30pm) 
Berman Bioethics Brin Lecture: Steven Joffe, MD, MPH, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more 
information, visit  http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
8 (12N-1:15pm) 
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Adnan Hyder, MD, PhD, MPH, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For 
more information, visit  http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
22 (12N-1:15pm) 
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Julian Savulescu, PhD, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more 
information, visit  http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
MARCH
4-6 
Approaching the Sacred: Science, Health and Practices of Care, JW Marriott Galleria, Houston, TX. For more information,  
visit www.MedicineandReligion.com. 
14 (12N-1:30pm) 
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more 
information, visit  http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
17-18 
Professional Skills Program in Dispute Resolution, sponsored by The Center for Dispute Resolution at the University of Maryland Fran-
cis King Carey School of Law and the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution at Pepperdine University School of Law. MD Carey Law, 
Baltimore, MD. For more information, visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/adrskills. 
17-18 
Are We Hearing Our Patients’ Voices? Healthcare Ethics Consortium Annual Conference. Atlanta Evergreen Marriott Conference Center, 
Stone Mountain, GA. For more information, visit http://www.hcecg.org/HEC_Conference_2016. 
17-18 
Bioethics: Preparing for the Unknown, sponsored by Western Michigan University’s Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Kalama-
zoo, MI. For more information about the Center, and updates about the conference, please visit www.wmich.edu/ethics.
28 (12N-1:15pm) 
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: John Wilbanks, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more informa-
tion, visit  http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
APRIL 
11 (12N-1:15pm) 
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Jerry Menikoff, MD, JD, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For more 
information, visit  http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series.
15-17 
Interfaces and Discourses: A Multidisciplinary Conference on Islamic Theology, Law, and Biomedicine, sponsored by The Initiative on 
Islam and Medicine at theUniversity of Chicago, Ida Noyes Hall – Cloister Club, Chicago, IL. For more information,  
visit https://pmruchicago.submittable.com/submit. 
25 (12N-1:15pm) 
Berman Bioethics Seminar Series: Ellen Clayton, MD, JD, MS, sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. For 
more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/seminar-series. 
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